We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidders in a way that maximizes the sum of bidders' values for their allocated items. Bidders have complex preferences over items expressed by valuation functions that assign values to all subsets of items.
INTRODUCTION
Combinatorial auctions are a central research area at the intersection of economics, game theory, and computer science. The welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions is an abstraction of many computational and economic resource-allocation problems. In this problem, an auctioneer sells a set M of m items to a set of k bidders. The value of bidder i for any subset (bundle) of items is given by a valuation set function vi : 2 M → R+, where vi(S) represents i's maximum willingness to pay for the bundle S. The two standard assumptions on each vi are that if S ⊆ T then vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) (monotonicity), and that vi(∅) = 0 (normalization). The objective is to partition M into k disjoint subsets S1, S2, . . . , S k in a way that maximizes the expression È 1≤i≤k vi(Si) (i.e., the social welfare). Algorithms for maximizing welfare in combinatorial auctions are required to be polynomial in the natural parameters of the problem, m and k. However, since the "input" (the valuation functions) is of exponential size one must specify how it can be accessed. Most works in this field have taken a "black box" approach in which bidders' valuation functions are accessed via oracles that can answer specific type of queries. Three types of queries have been considered [1, 2, 5] :
• Value queries: The query to a valuation function vi is in the form of a bundle S ⊆ M , and the response is vi(S).
• Demand queries: The query to a valuation function vi is in the form of a price vector p = (p1, ..., pm) and the response is the bundle T most demanded by vi given these prices. That is, T = argmax S⊆M vi(S) − È j∈S pj.
• General queries: We allow any type of query (to each valuation function alone). This model captures the communication complexity (between the bidders) of the problem. Due to its strength it is mostly interesting for proving lower bounds.
Value queries are strictly less powerful than demand queries, which, in turn, are strictly less powerful than general queries [1, 2, ?] . In this paper we focus our attention on the value query model. It has been shown that computing an optimal solution for social-welfare maximization requires an exponential number of queries even in the general queries model [13] . Hence, we are interested in the approximability of this problem. For the general case, the approximability of the problem is wellunderstood in all models [1, 13] . Researchers have also studied the approximability of the problem for restricted classes of valuation functions. Two families of such classes, that have natural economic interpretations [11, 5] , have been considered: Subadditive functions, and superadditive functions. A set function f : 2 M → R+ is subadditive iff for any two sets S and T , f (S) + f (T ) ≥ f (S ∪ T ), and is superadditive iff for any two disjoint sets S and T , f (S)+f (T ) ≤ f (S ∪T ). An important special case of subadditive functions are submodular functions. A set function f is submodular iff for any two sets S and T , f (S) + f (T ) ≥ f (S ∪ T ) + f (S ∩ T ). Submodular functions (that are monotone and normalized) are also reasonable to consider from an economic perspective as they characterize functions with decreasing marginal utilities [11] .
We present tight information-theoretic lower bounds for submodular, subadditive, and superadditive valuation functions in the value query model. We prove the following theorems:
Theorem: For any fixed ǫ > 0, achieving an approximation ratio of 1 − 1 e + ǫ for welfare-maximization with submodular functions requires an exponential number of value queries.
This matches the (1 − 1 e )-approximation (achieved with a polynomial number of value queries) recently shown by Vondrák [15] , who improved over the 1 2 -approximation shown by Lehmann et al. [11] . (We note that this problem can be formalized as the problem of maximizing a submodular function subject to a matroid constraint. Hence, the greedy algorithm developed by Fisher et al. [14] provides a 1 2 -approximation for this problem). The only previously known information-theoretic lower bound for this problem was 1 − O( 1 m ) (see [13] , in the general queries model. Our lower bound strengthens the 1 − 1 e + ǫ lower bound dependent on P = N P proven by Khot et al. [10] . We stress that our lower bound is independent of any computational complexity assumptions and holds even for algorithms of unbounded computational power, that are bounded only in terms of the number of value queries they can make. Also, we remark that the same inapproximability result does not hold in stronger query models -it is known that (1−1/e+ǫ)-approximation is possible with polynomially many demand queries [7] .
Theorem: For any fixed ǫ > 0, achieving an approximation ratio of presented by Dobzinski et al. [5] (achieved using a polynomial number of value queries). The previously known lower bound in the value query model was [4]. In fact, our lower bound holds even for the more restricted subclass of fractionally subadditive valuations [6] , introduced in [12] under the name of XOS.
Theorem: For any fixed ǫ > 0, achieving an approximation ratio of log 1+ǫ m m for welfare-maximization with superadditive functions requires a super-polynomial number of value queries.
This nearly matches the upper bound of √ log m m presented by Holzman et al. [9] (achieved via a polynomial number of value queries). A similar lower bound was known for general valuation functions [1, 2] . We extend this lower bound to the restricted class of superadditive functions. In fact, the lower bound holds for a superadditive analogue of fractionally subadditive functions (that is strictly contained in the class of superadditive valuation functions).
VALUE-QUERY COMPLEXITY OF SUB-MODULAR WELFARE MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we construct an example showing that it is impossible to achieve an approximation factor better than 1 − 1/e for submodular utility functions in the value oracle model. We consider algorithms whose running time is potentially unbounded, we only count the number of value queries posed by the algorithm. More precisely, we prove the following.
Theorem 2.1. For any fixed β > 0 and k ≥ 2, any (possibly randomized) (1 − (1 − 1/k) k + β)-approximation algorithm for m items and k players with submodular valuation functions requires e Ω(m) value queries, otherwise it fails with high probability.
k is arbitrarily close to 1 − 1/e for large enough k, this implies the following.
Corollary 2.2. For any fixed ǫ > 0, there is no (1 − 1/e + ǫ)-approximation for an arbitrary number of players, using a subexponential number of queries.
We note that our examples use the same submodular valuation function for all players, just like in the NP-hardness result of [10] . Thus the problem is hard to approximate even in the special case where all utility functions are equal. Our construction is different from [10] , however. While the hardness reduction of [10] uses explicit coverage-type submodular functions, our valuation functions are not exactly of the coverage type. Our construction is inspired by a lower bound developed by Feige et al. [8] for the problem of maximizing non-monotone submodular functions.
Overview of the Proof.
Consider a k-uniform hypergraph H = (X, E) and a function f : 2 X → R+ where f (S) is the number of hyperedges incident with the set of vertices S. This is a coverage-type submodular function. The idea is that it is hard to distinguish instances where H is a complete k-partite k-uniform hypergraph (and allocating one part Xi to each player results in a "perfect solution"), and instances where H is a complete k-uniform hypergraph (and then there is no "perfect solution"). Since vertices of the hypergraph could be labeled arbitrarily on the input, it's hard for any algorithm to find a set of vertices significantly overlapping with any Xi and hence it cannot distinguish these two cases.
In order to make the example work, we have to modify the coverage-type functions slightly. We consider a ground set X partitioned into X1 ∪ X2 ∪ . . . ∪ X k . The functions f (S) that we define depend only on the fractions of Xi that S contains: xi = |S ∩ Xi|/|Xi|. To simplify the notation, we work with continuous functionsf (x1, . . . , x k ). The following lemma states the properties that we needf (x1, . . . , x k ) to satisfy.
k → R be a function with continuous first partial derivatives, and second partial derivatives almost everywhere. Define a discrete function f : X → R so that
If
∂f ∂x i ≥ 0 everywhere for each i, then the function f is monotone. Proof. For monotonicity, it's sufficient to observe that if
≥ 0, thenf is non-decreasing in each coordinate. Hence, adding elements cannot decrease the value of f .
For the submodularity condition, fix an element in a ∈ Xi and consider a set S parameterized by xi = |S ∩ Xi|/|Xi|. The marginal value of a added to S is equal to
We want to prove that fS(a) cannot increase by adding elements to S, i.e. by increasing any coordinate xj. Because ∂f ∂x i is continuous and its derivative along xj,
, is nonpositive except at finitely many points,
is non-increasing in xj . By shifting the entire integral to a higher value of xj, the marginal value cannot increase.
Hence, we need our continuous functions to satisfy
, which implies monotonicity and submodularity in the discrete case. We call such functions smooth submodular. To shorten notation, we write
In each instance, all players have the same valuation function. We find two functions f, g such that we have f (x) = g(x) whenever maxi,j |xi − xj| ≤ ǫ. As we show later, this will imply that f and g are indistinguishable by a subexponential number of queries. We construct these two functions as follows.
Lemma 2.4. For any β > 0 and integer k ≥ 2, there is ǫ > 0 and two smooth submodular functions f, g :
and the function value depends only onx =
• max{
To be more precise, on any axis-parallel line there are only finitely many points where
is not defined.
Proof. We start by considering two smooth submodular functions, motivated by the examples of k-uniform hypergraphs that we discussed above.
xi. The optimal solution with valuation function f is xii = 1, xij = 0 for i = j. This way, each player gets value 1 and È i f (xi1, . . . , x ik ) = k. For g, on the other hand, the value depends only on the average of the coordinatesx. By the concavity of g, the optimum solution is to set xij = 1/k for all i, j, which gives total value
. It remains to perturb the functions so that f (x) = g(x) for vectors satisfying maxi,j |xi − xj| ≤ ǫ. Let h(x) denote the difference of the two functions,
Again, we denotex =
xi. Also, let δ = maxi,j |xi − xj|. First, we estimate h(x) and its first derivatives in terms ofx and δ. We use very crude bounds, to simplify the analysis.
Claim..
h(x).
1.
We have h(
2.
For a lower bound on h(x), suppose that δ = x2 − x1. For k = 2, we are done immediately since
Hence, we assume k > 2 and define η =
, and the average of the remaining coordinates isx + 2η. By the arithmetic-geometric mean inequality,
is maximized when these variables are all equal:
Again by the arithmetic-geometric mean inequality,
(1−x), we are done because then the last term is at least
. In this case, we throw away the last term and write
. We observe it always holds that δ ≤ k(1 −x): If the minimum coordinate is xmin, we havex ≤
3.
Let δ = maxi,j |xi−xj|. We estimate the partial derivative
(xj −x). I.e., xj =x + (k − 1)η and the average of the remaining coordinates isx−η. By the arithmeticgeometric mean inequality,
. Also, we know that all coordinates differ fromx − η by at most δ, in particular xj =x + (k − 1)η ≤x − η + δ, hence kη ≤ δ and
For a lower bound, it's enough to observe that each coordinate is at mostx + δ, and so
assuming that (k − 1) We return to our construction. We definef (x) = f (x) − φ(h(x)) where φ : R → R is defined so that φ(t) = t for small t ≥ 0, then φ(t) is increasing and concave with a controlled second derivative and finally φ(t) is bounded by a small constant everywhere. More precisely,
• For t ∈ [0, ǫ1], we set φ(t) = t. We choose ǫ1 = kǫ. I.e., for maxi,j |xi − xj| ≤ ǫ, we have h(x) ≤ ǫ1 by Claim 1 and thenf (x) = g(x).
• For t ∈ [ǫ1, ǫ2], the first derivative of φ is continuous at t = ǫ1 and its second derivative is φ ′′ (t) = −α/t for t ∈ [ǫ1, ǫ2]. Hence,
We choose α = 2/ ln
• For t > ǫ2, we set φ(t) = φ(ǫ2).
Hence, we have 0 ≤ φ(t) ≤ ǫ2 everywhere andf (x) = f (x)− φ(h(x)) ≥ f (x) − ǫ2. Next, we want to show that we didn't corrupt the monotonicity and submodularity of f too badly. We have 
The first two terms form a convex combination of non-positive values. To control the third term, we have |φ ′′ (h)| ≤ α/h. In Claim 3, we showed that
We can conclude that
We need to make the second partial derivatives non-positive. Since
, it is enough to add a suitable multiple of g to both functions:f =f + 2αk 6 g, g = (1 + 2αk 6 )g. Thenf ,ĝ are smooth submodular. Recall that we have α = 2/ ln 1 kǫ . For a given β > 0, we
6 /β , so that β = 2αk 6 and we increase g only by a factor of 1 + β. We also get ǫ2 = √ kǫ ≤ β, and thereforef (x) ≥f (x) ≥ f (x) − ǫ2 ≥ f (x) − β. Thusf and g satisfy the conditions of the lemma. Now we are ready to prove Theorem 2.1.
Proof. Consider a large set of elements X, partitioned into equal parts X1, . . . , X k . Lemma 2.4 defines two smooth submodular functions. By Lemma 2.3, we define discrete utility functions f, g : 2 X → R+. We consider two instances, where all utility functions are equal to either f or g. We present one of these two instances to a (possibly randomized) algorithm. The labeling of the elements of X is arbitrary and unknown to the algorithm; we can assume that it is uniformly random.
Let us assume that an algorithm queries a set S of size s. Let xi = |S ∩ Xi|/|Xi|. Since the partition is uniformly random, each xi is a random variable of expectation s/k and variance O(s). We consider k fixed here, while the number of elements m = |X| is very large. We can assume that s ≥ ǫm, otherwise the deviation of xi from its expectation can never be more than ǫm. Otherwise, by standard bounds, the probability of xi deviating from its expectation by more than ǫm decays as e −Ω(ǫ 2 m 2 /s) = e −Ω(ǫ 2 m) . Hence, it happens only with exponentially small probability that |xi − xj| > ǫ for any i = j. Let's call such a query unbalanced.
Consider any fixed sequence ofueries. Unless the number of queries q is exponentially large in m, it still happens only with an exponentially small probability that any query is unbalanced (by the union bound). Therefore, with high probability, no query is unbalanced. Now consider any (possibly randomized) algorithm, using a subexponential number of value queries. In the randomized case, let us condition on the random bits on the algorithm. Given this, the sequence of queries can depend only on the obtained answers. Note that for balanced queries, we have f (x) = g(x) and the function value depends only onx = 1 k È k i=1 xi, i.e. on the size of the queried set, which is the algorithm's own choice. Hence with high probability, the algorithm always follows the same sequence of (balanced) queries and the answers obtained are the same for f (x) and g(x). Intuitively, the algorithm never learns any information about the partition (X1, X2, . . . , X k ).
In the case of a randomized algorithm, we can now average over the choices of its random bits. Still, with high probability it never asks any unbalanced query and cannot distinguish between f (x) and g(x). If the underlying instance corresponds to f (x), the algorithm will never find any set whose value differs from that of g(x), and hence any solution obtained is at most (1 − (1 − 1/k) k + β) of the optimum.
VALUE-QUERY COMPLEXITY OF SUB-ADDITIVE WELFARE MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we construct an example showing that it is impossible to achieve an approximation factor significantly better than
for the subadditive welfare problem, using a polynomial number of value queries.
In fact, we prove our result for the more restricted class of fractionally subadditive valuation functions [12, 6] that is known to strictly contain all submodular valuation functions. A fractionally subadditive function is the pointwise maximum over a set of linear valuation functions. We prove the following theorem. We note that the result of Theorem 3.1 can be shown to hold even for the case that bidders have the same valuation function (as will be explained later).
Proof. We shall use probabilistic arguments (similar to those in Section 2) to show that any algorithm that obtains an 1 m 1 2 −ǫ -approximation to the social-welfare requires an exponential number of value queries. For simplicity, we shall start by proving the theorem for the case that bidders have different valuation functions. We shall later discuss how the proof can be extended to the more restricted case that all bidders have the same valuation function.
Fix a small constant δ > 0 (to be determined later). We shall construct a combinatorial auction with m items and k = √ m bidders. For every S let aS be the linear valuation function that assigns a value of 1 to each item j ∈ S, and 0 to each item j / ∈ S. Letā be the additive valuation that assigns every item j ∈ [m] a value of Using standard probabilistic arguments, and relying on the Chernoff bounds, it can be shown that P r[|S ∩ Ti| > (1 + δ)m 2δ ] is exponentially small (see Section 2). Now, consider a bundle S of size greater than m 1 2 +δ . vi will assign to S the value of (1 + δ)
Again, using standard probabilistic arguments it can be shown that P r[|S∩Ti| > (1+δ)
] is exponentially small.
We conclude that for every bundle S, only with exponentially small probability does one gather sufficient information to distinguish between the case that i's valuation is vi and the case that it is v ′ i . Hence, it requires an exponential number of value queries to distinguish between vi and v ′ i in the worst case. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
We note that this proof can be extended to the case that all bidders have the same valuation function. Observe, that all the vi functions are identical. We shall show how it is possible to make all the v ) and m, respectively). Hence, in order to obtain an approximationratio better than Ω(
), an exponential number of value queries in required.
VALUE-QUERY COMPLEXITY OF SU-PERADDITIVE WELFARE MAXIMIZA-TION
In this section, we construct an example showing that it is impossible to achieve an approximation factor significantly better than log m m for the superadditive welfare problem, using a polynomial number of value queries.
The construction of the example will be done in two steps. First, we shall define a subclass of superadditive valuation functions we term min-linear functions. This is a superadditive analogue of fractionally subadditive functions [12, 6] . We shall then prove our lower bound for this more restricted class. It is easy to show (and analogous to the proofs in [12, 11] ) that min-linear functions are contained in the class of superadditive valuation functions, and are a superclass of supermodular valuation functions. For completeness we present the simple proofs below. Simple examples demonstrate that these containments are strict. Proof. Let f = mina∈A a be a min-linear function. Let S and T be two disjoint subsets of items. By definition there are linear functions aS, aT , and aS∪T in A for which the value of S, T , and S ∪ T , is minimized. Therefore, it must hold that aS(S) ≤ aS∪T (S) and aT (T ) ≤ aS∪T (T ).
Hence: Proof. Let f be a supermodular valuation function. Fix an order on the items, w.l.o.g., 1, ..., m. For every set S we define a linear function aS as follows: For every j ∈ S aS({j}) = f ({1, ..., j}) − f ({1, ..., j − 1}). For every j / ∈ S aS({j}) = ∞, where ∞ represents a very large number (in particular f (M ) << ∞). It is easy to see that aS(S) = f (S) for any S. We want to show that f is min-linear and the finite set of linear functions is A = {aT } T ⊆M . For this, we need to show that aS(S) = mina T ∈A aT (S).
Observe that for any S, T such that S is not contained in T , it is impossible that the minimum for S is achieved by aT (because for some j ∈ S aT ({j}) = ∞). So, we are left with the case that S ⊆ T . Here we exploit the well-known fact that monotone supermodular functions have increasing marginal values. That is, if U ⊂ V ⊆ M , and j is in neither
It is easy to see that this implies that for S ⊆ T , for any j ∈ S aS({j}) ≤ aT ({j}). Hence, aS is indeed the linear function for which the minimum is achieved (for bundle S). This implies that f = min A.
We are now ready to prove the following theorem: We note that the result of Theorem 4.1 can be shown to hold even for the case that all bidders have the same valuation function (as will be discussed later).
Proof. For simplicity, we shall start by proving the theorem for the case that bidders have different valuation functions. We shall later discuss how the proof can be extended to the more restricted case that all bidders have the same valuation function.
We use probabilistic arguments similar to those in Section 2. . Each bidder i ∈ [k] is associated with a unique item di in M2. We partition M1, uniformly at random, into k = m log 1+ǫ m bundles T1, ..., T k of equal size (i.e., of size log 1+ǫ m). For each bidder i, let bi be the linear valuation function that assigns a value of 1 to di and 0 to all other items. By aS, we denote a linear function that assigns a value of 1 to each item in S and 0 to all other items.
Let v1, ..., v k be the k-tuple of valuation functions defined as follows:
This function has a very simple interpretation: It assigns a value of 1 to every set that contains di and more than 
This function too has a simple interpretation: It assigns a value of 1 to every set that contains di and Ti, or di and more than m 2 items in M1. It assigns 0 to all other sets. We shall show that it would take a super-polynomial number of value queries to distinguish between the case that i's valuation function is vi and the case that it is v . Recall that Ti is uniformly distributed over all sets of size log 1+ǫ m. For every item in Ti, the probability that it is contained in S is at most 
OPEN QUESTIONS
We conclude by exhibiting the following two open questions:
• For the case of submodular valuation functions, the only information-theoretic lower bound in the models of general and demand queries is 1 − O(1/m). There are indications that suggest the existence of a constant (1 − ǫ) lower bound (APX-hardness results in the demand query and general query models [3, 7] , and an integrality gap [4] ). Proving such a lower bound in any of these two models is a very interesting open question and seems to require non-trivial combinatorial constructions.
• We have presented tight lower bounds in the value query model for submodular and subadditive valuation functions. There is still a gap between √ log m m and log m m in the case of superadditive valuations. We have not considered the class of supermodular valuation functions, for which no information-theoretic lower bound is known in any of the models. Proving informationtheoretic lower bounds for this class is an open problem.
